Ramsey Zeitouneh
Reading
the articles for today’s lecture has given me a lot to think about in terms of
how we define terrorism and, more importantly, how we define terrorists. David
Rodin defines terrorism as:
"the deliberate, negligent, or reckless use of force against noncombatants by state or nonstate actors for ideological ends and in the absence of substantively just legal process."
This definition, I admit, is
very apt and useful in defining terrorism in a human rights context. However,
in my opinion, there are certain realities of warfare that may cause this
definition to fall short of defining terrorism as opposed to acts of “just” or
“precision” violence.
If this definition is to be taken
unconditionally, then are we to assume that any act of war is a terrorist activity?
While we may have no problem labeling Pearl Harbor as a terrorist act, would we
be as likely to call the dropping of the atomic bombs at Nagasaki and Hiroshima
as the same? Likewise, to put it in a more recent context, would we also call
the attack of SEAL Team Six on Osama bin Laden’s Pakistani compound another act
of terrorism, even though we were in fact apprehending a terrorist? Therefore,
I believe that situational context (a concept that Rodin actually touches upon)
should be considered at great length when we label an act of violence as
terroristic. Many historians don’t consider the American attacks on Nagasaki
and Hiroshima as terroristic because we were at war with Japan at the time,
while the attack on Pearl Harbor by Japanese forces was unprovoked. Historians
also justify those two attacks by using the argument that more American
soldiers would have died in a ground invasion of mainland Japan than Japanese
that died in the bombings (an argument that could be compared to the double
effect principle Rodin cites). Again, to place the controversy in a modern
context, I will turn to the analogy of drone attacks.
As
Amanda Mullins states in her article, the attacks of drones may have caused
between 474-881 civilian deaths in Pakistan alone. While these deaths are
certainly lamentable, when they are placed in the context of over 3,000 people,
the majority of whom being terrorists or suspected terrorists, killed by
drones, are they also justifiable? Is the US engaging in terrorism or are the
deaths of noncombatants in drone attacks simply the unfortunate, but necessary,
collateral of an ongoing war on terror? To answer this question, I think it is
best to apply the “double effect” principle as outlined by Rodin. According to
Rodin, “one may use a neutral or good means to achieve a good end which one foresees
will have evil consequences provided that (i) the evil consequences are not
disproportionate to the intended good, [and] (ii) the action is necessary in
the sense that there is no less costly way of achieving the good.” In my
opinion, I fell that these two quantifiers can be used to justify the use of
drones in Afghanistan and Pakistan. While it is very sad that civilian
casualties occur and we certainly need to have an open dialogue about the consequences of these drone attacks, I feel that it is not disproportionate to the good that has been brought by this advent in technology.
I also feel that drone attacks are a much safer and precise alternative to the
use of soldiers and manned aircraft, which both put civilians at risk and endanger the lives of American soldiers.
If you believe that drone attacks are a much safer and precise alternative to using soldiers--which I can also see as a good method--who gets brought to justice if illegal war crimes are committed during these acts? Is it the man operating the drone in California? Are these men held responsible in the eyes of the terrorists in their retaliation. Is it fair to put these men in that kind of risk? Just some ideas, great post!
ReplyDeleteI slightly disagree that Rodin's two quantifiers can be used to justify the use of drones. Because as we struggle to define terrorism/terrorist, it is also hard to define what is considered good and justified. Is it ever justified to have civilian causalities and aims to kill maybe one person? We are essentially putting a value on the life of innocent civilians (collateral damage). I understand that in warfare collateral damage is inevitable. Does that mean retaliation is inevitable as well?
ReplyDeleteI find it interesting that you brought up the question of whether or not we should consider dropping the atomic bomb during World War II an act of terrorism. Though it is certainly up for debate, I personally do believe this was a terrorist attack by the United States. Despite the fact that it most likely saved lives in the long-run, the A-bomb took the lives of such a large number of non-combatants that it is hard to justify such a destructive act. Due to the large number civilians killed during these bombing, I believe that Rodin would also consider them terrorist attacks.
ReplyDeleteI agree with Brandon that when a large number of innocent civilians are knowingly killed it can be considered a terrorist attack. It is not justified to kill all of these individuals for no apparent reason. Also, with drone warfare there is always the risk of retaliation upon the men operating the drones. This counteracts the whole concept of trying to prevent bloodshed of our own citizens.
ReplyDeleteMatt. I believe that when a war crime is committed using drones, that the person who issued those orders to use the drones in such a fashion should be the one to pay the price. If there were no orders to use the drones in such a manner, then I feel that the person at the controls should bear the consequence.
ReplyDelete