On Foust: Is the Bureaucracy to Blame?

The aftermath of 9/11 has ushered in a new era of warfare, and over the course of the War on Terror, the tactics we use to combat terrorism have changed drastically.  The Cold War arms race has often been referred to as laying the foundation for the military-industrial complex that is responsible for the advancement of weapons technology.  One major innovation in our warfare tactics was the introduction of cruise missiles and air-launched precision weapons.  The United States Navy has fully embraced precision weaponry for the past few decades, and all of our ships are armed to the tee with Tomahawk missiles and depending on the platform, a plethora of other weapons capabilities that have allowed us to fire on a target from the comfort of a ship or aircraft.  It is important to ask the question as to why the tactics of combat units employing precision weapons has not come under fire nearly as much as drone warfare campaigns have in recent memory.  The answer can be traced to a harrowing fact about the balance of power in Washington.  Our system via the AUMF has legally enabled our President, the Commander-in-Chief of the military, “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determined planned, authorized, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11^th, 2001.” (Foust)  This means that President Obama upon first entering the presidency was already capable of carrying out lethal missions anywhere that he has reason to believe requires action.  On September 18^th, 2001, Congress enabled this by creating the legislation.

I am not arguing that President Obama’s preferred use of drone warfare is unlawful.  However, I am concerned with the lack of accountability for a significant amount of operations.  Essentially, when we conduct standard operations, say for instance launching tomahawks from a destroyer in the Persian Gulf, that is an act of war that has to be given the green light from every echelon of the operational chain of command.  However, strikes of similar power from drones seem to circumvent the system, furthering the skepticism about the moral ambiguity of our use of drone warfare.  I believe that if drone warfare is to be a successful tool in combat, the decision-making process needs to more so resemble that of traditional military tactics.  Perhaps it is time for Washington to revisit the issue of checks and balances of power.